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Abstract: This study examines the impact of academic directors on IPO initial 
returns. With a sample of 208 Malaysian IPOs over the period of 2005 to 2015 
and applying a quantile regression (QR) technique, this study finds that the 
academic directors are significantly and negatively associated with IPO initial 
returns, indicating IPOs with more directors from the academia can better serve 
as a signal of a company’s quality. Such directors are perceived by potential 
investors as intellectuals capable of providing knowledgeable skills in complex 
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management. These findings indicate that IPO issuers can demonstrate their 
quality through a highly educated board. 
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1 Introduction 
In the Asian equity market, initial public offering (IPO) is a common means of raising 
capital and is among the important drivers of economic development (Ng, 2016). 
Additionally, the market has been subjected to substantial risks and volatility, which 
could manifest in higher IPO initial returns on the first trading day (Vithessonthi, 2014). 
The occurrence of high initial returns on the first trading day is often attributed to agency 
cost arising from information asymmetry between issuer and prospective investors (Ritter 
and Welch, 2002). These costs result in adverse selection and moral hazard problems for 
prospective investors, leading to improper valuation of the company value. In order to 
mitigate the agency cost that arises due to information disparities, academic scholars have 
suggested that observable corporate governance characteristics, such as board 
composition, can convey hidden information and actions which signal the IPO quality, 
thereby reducing the level of IPO initial returns (Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2001). 
Despite the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining IPO initial 
returns, only a few empirical studies have considered this issue in the Asian market, for 
example, Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) for the Indonesian and Yatim (2011) for the 
Malaysian IPO markets. These two studies have focused only on the general composition 
of the board of directors (e.g., board size, board independence, board leadership structure 
and board ownership) and its relationship with IPO initial returns. Moreover, recent 
corporate governance literature has established that governance quality has a positive 
impact on the value of IPO companies (Bertoni et al., 2014). 
One important way to identify a board with strong corporate governance quality is the 
educational background of directors (Anderson et al., 2011). The educational background 
of directors can make an important difference in such directors’ abilities to contribute to 
strategic decision-making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) and signal a company’s 
legitimacy by improving the board’s prestige (Certo, 2003; D’Aveni, 1990; Reeb and 
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Zhao, 2013; Wang et al., 2017). A director’s education signals his/her intellect and ability 
to better handle challenges (Bhagat et al., 2010). In fact, highly educated directors 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Wang et al., 2017) and academic directors provide better 
governance to the company in terms of advising and monitoring functions, thereby 
contributing to the corporate information environment (Cho et al., 2017; Francis et al., 
2015; Huang et al., 2016; White et al., 2014). Therefore, this study considers the presence 
of academic directors on the board at the time of an IPO as an important signalling 
mechanism that can be used strategically to reduce the degree of risks and uncertainties 
surrounding the IPO, leading to lower initial returns in the Malaysian IPO market. 
The Malaysian IPO market deserves consideration because the agency problem in the 
Malaysian IPO market is severe (Klapper and Love, 2004), due to the fact that ownership 
is concentrated and characterised by family control (Claessens et al., 2000). In this 
regard, strong corporate governance is expected to reduce agency cost and cost of capital 
to increase the chance of the company’s accessibility to finance in the capital market 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). In addition, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG)1 2012 does not specify the competencies of directors (e.g., 
experience and qualifications); rather, it indicates that companies should have a  
well-balanced and effective board of directors that is both credible and independent 
(Yusoff and Armstrong, 2012). Similarly, with the aim of becoming an industrialised, 
developed and high income economy, the Malaysian government in recent times has 
recognised the importance and unique benefit that collaboration between industry and 
university can provide for the economy. Universities are often positioned as central actors 
in the knowledge-based economy. Their industry collaboration has become a catalyst for 
human capital development, which is considered crucial for both national and regional 
economic development, in general, and development of a company’s innovative process, 
in particular. Universities help to upgrade skills and knowledge through education and 
training of the future labour force and provide technical support and expertise for a 
company’s research and development (R&D) activities (Hamdan et al., 2011). Given the 
role of universities in encouraging innovation through technology transfer, this study 
argues that having a number of academic directors may add value to a company’s board 
of directors, resulting in reduction in ex-ante uncertainties surrounding the IPO value. 
Therefore, this study tests whether academic directors at the time of an IPO, can explain 
IPO initial returns, which has not been explored hitherto. 
Furthermore, unlike prior studies (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013; Yatim, 2011) that 
have employed only the traditional regression technique [ordinary least squares (OLS)], 
which relies on the conditional mean or central tendency between board characteristics 
and IPO initial returns, the present study applies a more robust technique, i.e., quantile 
regression (QR) to test the association between academic directors and IPO initial 
returns. The use of QR allows the study to identify the heterogeneity in the association 
between academic directors in addition to other likely variables and IPO initial returns 
across quantiles. With the application of the OLS on a sample of 208 Malaysian IPOs, no 
significant association is found between academic directors and IPO initial returns. 
However, when the QR technique is employed, academic directors, in particular, the 
proportion of university lecturers on the board appears to have a significant and negative 
association with IPO initial returns in the upper quantile (.75th). This implies that 
academic directors have the intellectual capacity and training to play a signalling role 
through their advisory and monitoring functions that could mitigate the information 
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asymmetry and uncertainties surrounding the IPO value, thereby reducing the IPO initial 
returns. Thus, IPO companies can benefit from recognising the potential impact of 
including academic directors on their corporate board structure at IPO stage as this could 
add to the value of the board and increase the board’s reputation in the eyes of 
prospective investors. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
review and hypotheses development. Section 3 explains the data, the sample selection 
and methods of statistical analysis. Section 4 presents the regression results and 
discussion and Section 5 provides the conclusion of the study. 
2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Information asymmetry between parties (issuers and prospective investors) is common in 
the IPO market, because prospective investors have limited publicly available 
information. This information asymmetry leads to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, which creates substantial agency costs, making it difficult for prospective 
investors to distinguish IPO quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977). To mitigate the agency cost 
and adverse selection problems, IPO issuers use idiosyncratic signals, like structure of 
board of directors, to provide useful information to prospective investors, like the true 
value of the company and associated IPO initial returns (Certo et al., 2001; Chahine and 
Filatotchev, 2008; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). Thus, board structure can be 
considered as a key determinant of what board members can do and what roles the 
directors can play in a company (Petrovic, 2008). 
During the IPO process, the directors have enormous responsibilities, which include: 
choice of underwriters to undertake the company going public; ensuring that the company 
adheres to regulatory policies; controlling and monitoring procedures of listing; 
establishing an appropriate corporate governance structure; and overseeing the 
preparation of registration documents, filing and approval of the IPO (Judge et al., 2015). 
Other important responsibilities of the board of directors include monitoring the 
company’s operations and executing and evaluating strategic decisions that make a 
company remain a going concern. 
Considering the multifaceted responsibilities of the board in the IPO process, the 
expertise and competencies of the board may be very relevant in the valuation of the 
company. This is because the competence of the board would strengthen the overall 
function of the board and increase its quality. Therefore, the composition of the board of 
directors may influence the quality of board deliberations and decisions (Finkle, 1998). 
This can also proxy as a signal of the company’s quality (Certo et al., 2001), and serve as 
non-financial information that may influence the decision-making process of prospective 
investors when subscribing to the IPO (Certo, 2003; Li and Naughton, 2007). 
For these reasons, the board of directors should comprise directors from diverse 
backgrounds. This can be achieved by appointing academicians, because such individuals 
possess valuable knowledge needed for making strategic decisions and have better 
communication and management skills (Anderson et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2016). The 
appointment of intellectuals as board members can also signal to potential investors that 
the company is a legitimate one, worthy of support, which could help to reduce the cost 
of external capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). For instance, legitimacy is important in 
the case of an IPO company that seeks to establish itself as a viable publicly listed 
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company (Certo et al., 2001). In addition, legitimacy, through a prestigious board, may 
help the company to reduce information asymmetry that may deter prospective investors. 
Thus, prestigious or legitimate persons on the company’s board provide confirmation to 
the rest of the world of the value and worth of the company (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
2.1 Academic directors as a signalling mechanism 
Academic directors are often considered as outside directors with relatively high 
reputation. These individuals are tutored to be independent and critical thinkers with their 
own opinions and judgements and less influenced by others (Jiang and Murphy, 2007). 
Academic directors play an important governance role through their advising and 
monitoring functions (Francis et al., 2015; White et al., 2014). For the advisory role, 
Francis et al. (2015) find that companies with academic directors are more innovative due 
to their specialised expertise; while for the monitoring role, Francis et al. (2015) and 
Trainor and Finnegan (2013) find that academic directors are associated with less 
discretionary accruals, indicating that academic directors improve the financial reporting 
quality of the company. In a similar vein, Huang et al. (2016) report that academic 
directors, specifically accounting academics as outside directors, improve financial 
reporting quality and enhance corporate transparency. More importantly, greater value 
relevance of reported earnings appears in companies where accounting academics serve 
as financial experts on the board. Additionally, Francis et al. (2015) find that companies 
with academic directors have more informative stock price, suggesting that such 
companies’ share price always reflects more company-specific information. In fact, the 
market reacts positively to the appointment of academic directors, which indicates that 
the market perceives the incremental value of academic directors (White et al., 2014). 
Similarly, Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) contend that directors with an academic 
background can enhance the competitive advantage of companies by facilitating access to 
and absorption of external knowledge spill-over. In fact, Huang et al. (2016) find that 
academic directors who are accounting academics can substitute auditors’ monitoring 
role in financial reporting. A study by Cho et al. (2017) also finds that companies with 
professors as directors are associated with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
performance rating indicating that university professors possess some high ethically and 
socially responsible standards which may constitute an important factor that can affect 
corporate policy, like CSR activities. 
In a similar vein, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) argue that the educational 
background of directors creates important differences in their abilities to contribute to 
strategic decision-making. Therefore, a highly educated board signals organisational 
legitimacy by improving the board’s prestige (D’Aveni, 1990; Certo, 2003; Reeb and 
Zhao, 2013). 
When appointing directors, their educational qualification may play an important role, 
because education contributes to knowledge and ability to understand technical and 
abstract concepts (Bhagat et al., 2010). Empirical evidence on educational qualification 
of directors have had little (Darmadi, 2013) or no effect (Bhagat et al., 2010) on  
long-term company performance, while others have found a positive impact on company 
performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ujunwa, 2012; Reeb and Zhao, 2013). Wang  
et al. (2017) provide evidence that companies with highly educated directors on the 
board, tend to hold more cash and are associated with higher value of cash, most 
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especially in financially constrained companies. This implies that a highly educated board 
provides better monitoring and advising functions and thus complements corporate 
governance. Similarly, Dalziel et al. (2011) argue that advanced degrees, such as PhD, 
could equip directors with extra skills that could be beneficial for the company, especially 
in their R&D efforts. Empirical evidence by Kuo et al. (2018) reveals that higher 
education of directors has a positive effect on R&D investments in a company. In fact, 
Francis et al. (2015) indicate that academic directors with innovative capabilities sit on 
the boards of research-intensive companies. Using a sample of biotechnology IPOs, 
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) identify that university-based scientists perform three 
primary functions: first, is the provision of knowledge transfer to new biotechnology 
companies; second, is to signal the quality of the company to scientific and investment 
communities, which is referred to as bait to investment communities; and third, is to chart 
the scientific direction of the company. Considering these primary functions of 
university-based scientists, Stephan (1994) shows that the reputation of a university-
based scientist affiliated with a company is positive and significantly related to the 
amount of capital raised from IPO and the value of the company on the first trading day. 
Similarly, based on a sample of 499 high-tech SMEs that went public on the stock 
markets of Germany, the UK, France and Italy during the period of 1995 to 2003, 
Bonardo et al. (2011) find that the presence of academic directors on the top management 
team of companies at the time of IPO enhances the company’s valuation. This suggests 
that investors value the presence of academic directors and may consider this before 
making investment decisions. In addition, since academic directors hold higher level 
degrees in various subject matters, academic directors may simply be referred to as 
subject matter experts who can provide independent judgement in various strategic 
decisions (Trainor and Finnegan, 2013). In fact, academic directors are generally viewed 
as role models, mentors and intellectual leaders in their given disciplines or areas of 
expertise (Macfarlane, 2011). Considering all these factors, such as expertise, 
independence and experience of academic directors, academics are better placed to 
contribute to the overall governance of the company, which could mitigate information 
asymmetry and uncertainties surrounding the IPO value. 
2.1.1 Hypothesis development 
Since IPO companies are mostly small and growth-oriented companies with high degree 
of uncertainties, the presence of highly educated individuals and/or individuals with 
strong academic backgrounds, may instil some confidence in potential investors that the 
company has competent directors with good standing. As such, issuers may leverage on 
academic directors’ expertise at the time of the IPO (Certo, 2003). For instance, directors 
with higher level degrees, such as PhD and/or professorial qualifications, signal superior 
quality of human capital on the board (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2006), because such 
degrees reveal that these directors have spent a substantial amount of time in the 
academic environment which could have provided the directors valuable knowledge 
necessary for strategic decision-making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Therefore, 
directors from the academic environment with higher level degrees may influence 
investors’ perceptions of the company’s value, thus reducing the level of IPO initial 
returns. In fact, a growing company considers the appointment of knowledgeable  
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directors as a viable source of outside expertise when expanding the board. Likewise, 
high growth established companies with high information costs and R&D investment 
tend to appoint academic directors with specialised expertise as the market reacts 
positively to their appointment (White et al., 2014). Therefore, this study argues that 
academic directors, or the percentage of academicians to the total number of directors on 
the board, number of PhD holders and the presence of professors on the board at the time 
of an IPO, may be negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
H1 Academic directors are negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
2.2 Other board characteristic variables 
Other instruments that can be used to resolve agency and adverse selection problems 
arising from an IPO decision are board independence, board size and chief executive 
officer (CEO) duality (Roosenboom, 2005; Howton et al., 2001). In the case of board 
independence, the resource-dependence theory suggests that non-executive directors 
provide valuable scarce information or resources to the company (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and participate actively in board discussion, most 
especially discussion related to corporate strategic decisions (Chahine and Filatotchev, 
2008; Finkle, 1998). Similarly, the signalling theory suggests that investors use board 
independence as a market sorting criteria in the IPO market and such companies are 
premium-priced compared to their counterparts with more insiders (Gompers, 1995). 
Following these two arguments, a number of studies has found that board independence 
is negatively associated with IPO initial returns, meaning that board independence can 
serve as a signalling means to mitigate the information asymmetries associated with 
agency cost at the time of IPO (Chiraz and Jarboui, 2016; Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008; 
Dolvin and Kirby, 2016; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Hearn, 2012). 
In contrast, Certo et al. (2001) and Howton et al. (2001) find that board independence 
is positively and significantly related to IPO initial returns, which means that initial 
returns is higher for company boards dominated by independent directors. These results 
are consistent with the argument that high-quality companies intentionally underprice 
their IPO in order to signal their quality to other market participants, which low quality 
companies find difficult to imitate. Based on this evidence, this study argues that an IPO 
company with a higher number of non-executive directors on the board is likely to set the 
offer price close to its fair value, thus reducing the level of IPO initial returns. Hence, this 
study posits that board independence is negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
Similar to the independence of the board, board size is another widely used measure 
of resource-dependence role and effectiveness of the board (Howton et al., 2001; Jensen, 
1993). According to the resource-dependence theory, larger boards increase the chances 
of a company to pool resources from the external environment (Badru et al., 2017a; 
Finkle, 1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Large boards can also increase the power of 
directors in governing the company, thereby discouraging management from any act that 
could lead to extraction of private benefits (Boone et al., 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
In fact, a company may benefit from large board size because such a company would 
have directors from diverse educational and industrial backgrounds and skills, which 
could improve the quality of board deliberations and decisions as well as quality of 
advice given to managers (Coles et al., 2008). 
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Considering the likely implication of board size on resource-dependence and 
monitoring effectiveness, one may suggest that board size can play a signalling role at the 
time of an IPO. Empirical evidence by Certo et al. (2001) shows that board size is 
negatively associated with IPO initial returns, which means that larger boards are 
associated with less IPO initial returns. On the contrary, Chiraz and Jarboui (2016), 
Hearn (2012) and Li and Naughton (2007) find that board size is positively associated 
with IPO initial returns in French, West African and Chinese company IPOs. Despite the 
contradictory evidence, Hearn (2012) claims that the positive impact of board size on IPO 
initial returns is a signal that a large board can be considered as a reflection of the 
company’s quality. Hence, this study suggests that board size is negatively associated 
with IPO initial returns. 
Another important signal of a company’s quality through board structure is the 
separation of the position of the CEO and chairperson of the board. A dual leadership role 
occurs when the CEO jointly serves as the board chairperson, which means power of 
decision management and decision control in a single individual (Fama and Jensen, 
1993). This provides too much power to one individual, which consequently impairs 
board oversight and governance roles (Howton et al., 2001; Jensen, 1993). However, 
proponents of the stewardship theory argue that CEO duality encourages managers to be 
honest and good stewards of corporate assets (Li and Naughton, 2007). Similar 
arguments from resource-dependence theorists suggest that CEO duality provides the 
company several potential benefits, such as increasing the company’s responsiveness and 
its ability to secure critical resources, most especially in a complex environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). For instance, an individual, as both the chairperson and CEO, is 
believed to have company-specific and superior knowledge than independent directors, in 
formulating company strategy and policy (Bédard et al., 2008). Therefore, prospective 
investors can view and value clarity of strategic decisions of an IPO company when a 
single individual serves as both the chairperson and CEO, thus resulting in lower initial 
returns. This is because CEO duality may have a positive impact on company value and 
reduce the uncertainties surrounding the intrinsic value of the company’s shares (Certo  
et al., 2001). Li and Naughton (2007) find a negative but insignificant association 
between CEO duality and IPO initial returns in China, suggesting that CEO duality 
results in lower initial returns. 
However, Yatim (2011) finds a significantly positive association between CEO 
duality and IPO initial returns in the Malaysian IPO market, which indicates that 
investors consider the separation of the two roles as a negative signal of company value. 
Most other prior empirical studies on IPOs in the US (Dolvin and Kirby, 2016; Howton  
et al., 2001), West Africa (Hearn, 2012) and Canada (Bédard et al., 2008) have 
documented a non-significant positive association between CEO duality and IPO initial 
returns. Thus, one can conclude that the separation of the two roles does not mitigate 
asymmetric information and may engender costs in monitoring the Chairperson and 
information sharing between CEO and Chairperson. Based on these conflicting results, 
this study relies on the arguments of Bédard et al. (2008), Li and Naughton (2007) and 
Certo et al. (2001), that CEO duality reduces the uncertainties surrounding the intrinsic 
value of shares. This is most especially so in IPO companies which are potential growth 
companies that are risky and difficult to value, and which often require being managed by 
incumbent directors rather than independent directors. As a result, the study predicts that 
CEO duality is negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
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2.3 Company-specific variables 
In order to avoid omitted variable biasness, the study considers other factors that have a 
strong influence on IPO initial returns, i.e., company age, company size, pre-IPO 
financial performance, underwriter’s reputation, audit quality and technology industry. 
Lowry et al. (2010) suggest that young and small companies tend to have higher 
initial returns due to the difficulty and the uncertainties associated with the valuation of 
such a company’s shares. It is assumed that the longer the operating history of the 
company, the more likely the information about the company is available for public 
consumption, thereby leading to lower information asymmetry and ex-ante uncertainty. 
Consistent with this line of argument, several empirical studies have reported the 
existence of a negative association between company age and IPO initial returns 
(Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008; Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Loughran and Ritter, 
2004). Therefore, this study posits that company age is negatively associated with IPO 
initial returns. Similarly, company size, proxied by pre-IPO sales revenue, has been found 
to be negatively associated with IPO initial returns (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008). 
Hence, this study predicts that company size is negatively associated with IPO initial 
returns. Technology-related IPOs are also considered to be associated with higher initial 
returns due to hype and riskiness of such IPOs (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). Studies have 
argued that technology IPOs are associated with high degree of uncertain future cash 
flow streams, which may increase the level of information asymmetry between IPO 
parties (Leone et al., 2007). Therefore, this study suggests that IPOs that belong to the 
technology industry are positively associated with IPO initial returns. 
Companies rely on reputation of financial intermediaries (underwriters and audit 
firms) to reduce the asymmetric information problem in equity offerings. These 
categories of financial intermediaries have greater incentives to provide credible 
information on valuation of IPOs because of potential lawsuit and risks to their reputation 
capital (Aharony et al., 1993). For instance, Booth and Smith (1986) argue the reputation 
of underwriters who certify the IPO, can be used as a signal of the company’s quality and 
to infer to investors the likely outcome of the future performance of such an IPO. 
Similarly, Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Ritter (2003) indicate that because of reputational 
capital and legal risk, underwriters prefer to certify less risky companies and balance the 
interests of investors and issuers. Consistent with these arguments, studies have found a 
negative association between underwriter reputation and IPO initial returns (Darmadi and 
Gunawan, 2013; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). Therefore, this study posits that underwriter 
reputation is negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
Due to greater information asymmetry that characterises the IPO market, the 
reputation of the audit firm that certifies the financial statement may convey important 
information to investors, and investors may rely on the audit firm reputation as a proxy 
for financial statement quality presented in the prospectus (Sarath, 2016). According to 
signalling theorists, higher quality audit firms play a significant role in signalling the 
quality of a company’s value (Beatty, 1989; Titman and Trueman, 1986). Most 
especially, when a Big Four audit firm monitors the financial reporting process of a 
company, corporate equity financing becomes cheaper and significantly associated with 
ex-ante cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2016). Thus, the quality of audit to mitigate 
information failure in the market becomes crucial. Several studies have confirmed that 
companies certified by high quality audit firms have negative association with IPO initial 
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returns (Beatty, 1989; Michaely and Shaw, 1995). Hence, this study predicts that the 
reputation of the audit firm is negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
3 Data and research methods 
The primary source of data collection is the prospectus. The prospectuses of the sampled 
companies are downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia’s website. The prospectuses contain 
all ex-ante information related to the IPO. This includes data related to the offer price, 
governance structure of the company prior to the IPO, financial data, audit quality and 
underwriter’s reputation. Data related to the closing price on the first trading day for each 
IPO stock is obtained from the DataStream database of Universiti Utara Malaysia’s 
library. Based on the statistics available on the Bursa Malaysia’s website, a total of  
301 IPOs were issued during the period of January 2005 to December 2015. Consistent 
with prior IPO studies (Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2016; Badru et al., 2017a, 2017b; 
Rashid et al., 2014), the study excludes IPOs that are categorised as real estate investment 
trusts (REITs), special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and close-ended fund 
IPOs due to their regulatory requirements, which are different from the general 
population of the IPOs. In addition, the study eliminates IPOs with missing data needed 
to measure some of the variables (like Altman Z-score), that serve as a comprehensive 
measure of pre-IPO performance. As a result, the final sample of the study is 208 IPOs, 
which is 69% of the total IPOs issued during the sample period. This study uses the 
binary score of 1 for IPOs with Z-SCORE value less than 1.23, and 0 if otherwise. This is 
represented as Z-SCOREDM. 
3.1 Research method 
The dependent variable in the study is IPO initial returns and this is calculated as the 
percentage difference between the closing pricing of IPO shares on the first trading day 
and the pre-IPO offer price (Badru and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018; Certo et al., 2001; Darmadi 
and Gunawan, 2013). 
To test the relationship between IPO initial returns and academic directors and other 
board structure variables as well as other influential variables, IPO initial returns (IRC) is 
regressed on the presence of professors on the board (PROFDUM), percentage of PhD 
degree holders on board (PHD), percentage of university lecturers on the board  
(LEC), board size (BSIZE), board independence (BINDEP), CEO duality (CEODUA), 
company age (LNAG), underwriter’s reputation (UNDERQ), audit quality (AUDITQ), 
technology industry (HITECH), company size (LNSALES) and pre-IPO performance  
(Z-SCOREDM). The relationships of all the variables are examined using OLS 
regression and QR technique. The use of the QR technique addresses the non-normality 
of the IPO initial returns (see Table 2), as the traditional technique may not be able to 
capture the extreme upper or lower tails (Badru et al., 2017a; Koenker and Bassett, 1978; 
Raji et al., 2017). In addition, the Jarque-Bera normality test results show that the IPO 
initial returns data are not normally distributed (X2 (2) = 17.96 and p-value = 0.00). As 
such, the QR enables the study to provide a detailed and complete picture of the 
association between academic directors and other influential variables and IPO initial 
returns across quantiles. The quantile distributions are categorised into the low (.25), 
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medium (.50) and extreme (.75) quantile levels. By so doing, Model 1 estimates the OLS 
regression model, while Model 2 presents the QR model. 
 Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12
i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i
IRC PROFDUM PHD LEC LNBSIZE BINDEP
CEODUA LNAG UNDERQ AUDITQ HITECH
LNSALES Z SCOREDM ε
 (1) 
 Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
q q q i q i q i q i
q i q i q i q i
q i q i q i q i
i
IRC PROFDUM PHD LEC LNBSIZE
BINDEP CEODUA LNAG UNDERQ
AUDITQ HITECH LNSALES Z SCOREDM
ε
 (2) 
where q indicates a quantile in the conditional distribution of initial returns. The q(s) 
values are 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. 










where IRCi,t is the first closing day initial returns for company i on the first day of 
trading; Pi,t is the closing price of company i at the end of the first day of listing; and Pi,0 
is the offer price of company i at the time of issue. 
PROFDUM is a binary number of 1 for IPO that has a professor on the board, and 0, 
if otherwise; PHD is the percentage of directors that have PhD qualification to total 
number of directors on the board at the time of IPO; LEC is the percentage of directors 
who were previously or presently lecturers at the time of IPO; BSIZE is the total number 
of directors on the board at the time of IPO; BINDEP represents the proportion of  
non-executive directors on the board to total number of directors on the board at the time 
of IPO; CEODUA is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the positions of chairperson and 
CEO are held by a single individual at the time of IPO; LNAG is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the company age in years measured as the year of establishment to listing date. 
UNDERQ represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO is certified by one of the top 
five reputable underwriters, and 0, if otherwise. The top five reputable underwriters are 
identified using the Megginson and Weiss’s (1991) method of classifying reputable 
underwriters based on their market share. Therefore, the five reputable underwriters 
based on their market share in terms of IPO proceeds raised are CIMB, AM Merchant 
Bank, Affin/Hwang Investment Berhad, Maybank Securities and Alliance Merchant 
Bank. Similarly, AUDITQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor who certifies the 
financial statement at the time of IPO belongs to the Big4 audit firms in Malaysia, and 0, 
if otherwise. The Big4 audit firms, as defined by Carlin et al. (2009) and Lee and Ali 
(2008) in Malaysia, include PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler (KPMG), Ernst & Young and DeloitteKassimChan. Other variables used in 
this study include HITECH, which represents a dummy variable of 1 for IPOs in the 
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technology industry, and 0, if otherwise. LNSALES is the natural logarithm of the  
pre-IPO sales and finally, the Z-SCORE is estimated as follows: 
1 2 3 4 50.717 0.847 3.107 0.420 0.998i i i i i iZ X X X X X  (4) 
where Z is the overall financial performance of the company; X1 represents the net assets 
of the company’s liquidity relative to total assets, which is calculated as current assets 
minus current liabilities scaled by total assets; X2 represents the total amount of 
reinvested earnings calculated as retained earnings scaled by total assets; X3 represents 
the productivity of the company’s assets calculated as earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets; X4 represents the gearing capacity of the company calculated as 
book value of equity scaled by book value of liabilities; and X5 represents income 
generating ability and management capacity in dealing with competitive conditions. This 
is calculated as sales divided by total assets. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of initial returns data across years of listing. The 
mean (median) level of IPO initial returns varies over the years. For the total sample 
period, the mean (median) is 6.94% (4.55%). The mean (median) level of IPO initial 
returns found in this study is lower than IPO initial returns reported by prior IPO studies 
in Malaysia. For example, Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2016) report a mean (median) 
level of initial returns of 21.22% (12.92%), Rashid et al. (2014) document average initial 
returns of 29.44% and Yatim (2011) reports mean (median) level of initial returns as 
28.37% (17.50%). 
Table 1 Distribution of IPO initial returns for a sample of 208 IPOs 
Year N Min Mean Median Maximum Std. dev. 
2005 54 –66.67 3.63 0.00 86.76 33.98 
2006 30 –78.44 8.63 14.47 41.95 26.75 
2007 18 –42.73 14.17 14.15 70.34 29.13 
2008 18 –70.69 –18.99 –16.00 5.52 21.57 
2009 11 –10.00 14.13 10.77 61.11 20.56 
2010 21 –13.28 2.99 0.91 30.00 10.97 
2011 16 –48.39 14.70 7.95 96.67 33.19 
2012 10 –15.00 3.55 1.69 23.61 12.43 
2013 12 –13.79 21.30 14.50 76.00 24.98 
2014 10 –25.38 12.44 7.71 55.20 19.87 
2015 8 –0.55 31.24 28.93 93.33 30.17 
2005–2015 208 –78.44 6.94 4.55 96.67 28.52 
However, the mean initial returns found in the study is comparable to initial returns 
reported in advanced markets, like the US, which is between 10% and 25% (e.g., Boulton 
et al., 2011; Engelen and van Essen, 2010) and France, whose mean (median) level of 
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IPO initial returns is 6.7% (5.00%) (Chiraz and Jarboui, 2016). This indicates that 
Malaysian IPOs are gradually moving towards an efficient market. In addition, the 
greatest level of IPO initial returns was experienced in 2013 and 2015, which is between 
21.30% and 31.24%, respectively. On the other hand, there was presence of overpricing 
in the year 2008, which indicates that prospective investors achieved no positive initial 
returns in 2008 (–18.99). This suggests that the financial contagion of the 2008 global 
financial crises was reflected in the Malaysian IPO market. This caused a fall in equity 
prices and a negative investment environment. Hence, there is a strong correlation 
between the changes in share prices of IPO companies and the global financial crisis. 
In Table 2, the summary statistics of all variables used in the study are presented. 
Similar to Yatim (2011) who presents a mean (maximum) board size of 7 (16), the mean 
(maximum) number of directors on the board at the time of IPO is 6.85 (13.00). 
Compared to Yatim (2011) who shows that the mean (maximum) proportion of  
non-executive directors is 53% (100%), the mean (maximum) proportion of  
non-executive directors on the board of IPO companies at the time of IPO in Malaysia is 
60.84% (100%). This result is slightly similar to the mean proportion of non-executive 
directors of mature companies, which is 63% as reported by Yatim et al. (2006). The 
difference occurs because the proportion of board independence increases over time as 
the company becomes a listed company. By implication, the agency’s cost of equity for 
IPO companies is likely to increase over time in case there is no monitoring provided by 
alternative governance mechanisms (Yatim, 2011). 
The mean (maximum) proportion of directors with PhD qualification is 5.71% 
(37.50%), while that of academic directors is 4.83% (60%). In addition, the mean 
(maximum) age that a company issues an IPO is approximately six years (38 years). 
Similarly, the mean (1.99) pre-IPO financial performance is above the standard rule of 
Altman (2000) Z-score model, which is 1.23. The mean (maximum) value for the total 
sales is RM 222.15 million (RM 7,474.85 million). 
Further statistics in Panel B indicates that the mean of underwriter’s reputation and 
audit quality is 43.27% and 40.87%, respectively. This shows that less than half of the 
IPOs are underwritten by reputable underwriters and have their financial statement 
audited by Big Four audit firms. CEO duality and presence of professors on the board 
have mean of 25% and 10%, respectively. By implication, 75% of the IPOs in the sample 
period have the role of CEO/chairperson separated, a result that is slightly higher than 
that reported by Yatim (2011). The low percentage of companies that have an individual 
holding the position of CEO and Chairperson implies that the separation of the two 
positions is prevalent in the Malaysian IPO market. This increases the monitoring 
capacity of the board to constrain management rent seeking behaviour and managerial 
opportunism (Dowell et al., 2011). 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
The result of the correlation analysis presented in Table 3 indicates that two variables 
(HITECH and CEODUA) are significantly and negatively correlated with IPO initial 
returns at 5% and 1%, respectively, suggesting that IPOs that belong to the technology 
industry are less likely to experience higher initial returns. This type of IPO is 
characterised by low pre-IPO financial performance (Z-SCOREDM), smaller company 
size (LNSALES), smaller board size (BSIZE), lower proportion of non-executive 
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directors (BINDEP) and with CEO duality (CEODUA). In addition, the negative 
correlation between CEODUA and IPO initial returns implies that companies with the 
same individual holding the position of chairperson and CEO of the company are less 
likely to experience higher initial returns. This evidence supports Certo et al.’s (2001) 
argument that investors value CEO duality as a positive signal that reduces the 
uncertainties surrounding the intrinsic value of the company shares, especially IPO 
companies that are mostly growth-oriented with uncertain future cash flow streams. 
Notably, the proportion of non-executive directors and the number of directors on the 
board of companies at the time of IPO are positively correlated to company size. 
Similarly, the likelihood of having the presence of a professor (PROFDUM) on the board 
correlates with the proportion of PhD holders (PhD) and academic directors (LEC) on the 
board of IPO companies. Although these variables (PROFDUM, PhD and LEC) are 
insignificantly correlated with IPO initial returns, they all display negative correlation 
with IPO initial returns. 
In addition to the correlation results, a paired t-test of differences is conducted to test 
whether there is a significant difference in IPO initial returns of companies with 
academic directors and those without academic directors.2 Based on the independent 
sample t-test, the results show that average initial returns (0.93) of IPOs with academic 
directors is significantly lower than average initial returns (8.80) of IPOs without 
academic directors (t-value = 1.71). This indicates that academic directors can better 
serve as a signal of IPO quality, thereby leading to lower IPO initial returns. 
4.3 Regression results 
Before embarking on the regression analysis presented in Table 5, the study tests for the 
presence of multicollinearity among the variables. Based on the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) presented in Table 5, the VIF results indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue 
in the study as most of the variables have VIFs below two, which is lower than the 
critical value of 10 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
Table 5 provides the results of the OLS and the QR analysis on the association 
between initial returns and all explanatory variables. Based on the OLS results as shown 
in column two, only CEO duality is negatively and significantly (at 1% level) associated 
with IPO initial returns, while other variables are found to be insignificantly associated 
with IPO initial returns. However, when the QR is applied to test the association between 
all the explanatory variables and IPO initial returns, some level of significant associations 
are established. This provides that if not for QR, other variables would have been 
reported to be insignificantly associated with IPO initial returns. 
Detailed results presented in Table 5, in columns 3, 4 and 5, show that the signs of 
technology IPOs and company size change in the lower (.25th) and upper quantile (.75th) 
levels of IPO initial returns. In the lower quantile, technology IPOs are negatively 
associated with IPO initial returns at the 1% significance level, whereas in the upper 
quantile, a significantly positive association is presented. The significantly positive 
association reflects the assertion of ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis by Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), that technology IPOs are characterised by a greater degree of uncertainty because 
of uncertain future cash flow streams from investment in growth opportunities, which 
makes the valuation of technology IPOs more complex. As a result, issuers try to 
compensate prospective investors with high initial returns on the first trading day by 
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setting a lower offer price in order to encourage them to subscribe to the companies’ 
shares. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of all research variables 
Panel A: continuous variables 
Variable Min Mean Median Maximum Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
IRC –78.44 6.94 4.38 96.67 28.59 0.30 4.31 
AG 1.30 5.92 3.00 38.00 6.80 2.57 9.80 
LNAG 0.26 1.39 1.10 3.64 0.79 1.09 3.17 
Z_SCORE 0.18 1.99 1.82 6.71 0.98 1.06 5.41 
TS (in millions) 1.17 222.15 53.73 7474.85 756.80 7.06 57.99 
LNTS 14.37 17.81 17.79 22.73 1.53 0.32 3.31 
BSIZE 4.00 6.85 7.00 13.00 1.53 0.90 4.33 
LNBSIZE 1.37 1.90 1.95 2.56 0.22 0.20 3.11 
BINDEP 2.00 4.20 4.00 13.00 1.86 1.37 5.40 
BINDEP (in %) 33.33 60.84 57.14 100.00 0.20 0.62 2.36 
PhD (in %) 0.00 5.71 0.00 37.50 0.09 1.41 3.98 
LEC (in %) 0.00 4.83 0.00 60.00 0.10 2.42 9.60 
Panel B: dichotomous variables 
Variables 1 % 0 % 
PROFDUM 21 10.10 187 89.90 
CEODUA 52 25.00 156 75.00 
UNDERQ 90 43.27 118 56.73 
AUDITQ 85 40.87 123 59.13 
HITECH 53 25.48 155 74.52 
Z-SCOREDM 50 24.04 158 75.96 
Notes: IRC represents initial returns. AG represents the company age, measured as the 
year of establishment to listing date, while LNAG is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the company age in years. Z-SCORE is the continuous value derived from 
Altman Z-score model in model 4. TS represent the company size, which is 
measured by pre-IPO sales, while LNTS is the natural logarithm of pre-IPO sales. 
BSIZE represents board size, which is the total number of directors on the board 
at the time of IPO, while LNBSIZE is the natural logarithm of BSIZE. BINDEP 
represents board independence, measured as the proportion of non-executive 
directors on board to total number of directors. PhD is the proportion of directors 
that have PhD qualification to total number of directors. LEC represents academic 
directors, measured as the percentage of directors that were previously or 
presently lecturers at the time of IPO. PROFDUM is a binary number of 1 for IPO 
that has a professor on board, and otherwise, 0. CEODUA is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the positions of chairperson and CEO are held by a single 
individual at the time of IPO, and otherwise, 0. UNDERQ represents a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for reputable underwriter, and otherwise, 0. AUDITQ is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for reputable audit firm, and otherwise, 0. HITECH 
represents a dummy variable of 1 for IPOs in the technology industry, and 
otherwise, 0. Z-SCOREDM represents a binary figure of 1 for IPOs with Altman 
Z-score value less than 1.23, and otherwise, 0. IPOs given the value of 1 are 
considered as companies with weak pre-IPO financial performance. 
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Table 4 Paired t-test results on the comparison between IPOs with academic directors and 
IPOs without academic directors 
Grouping Observations Average initial returns (%) 
IPOs with academic directors 50 0.93 
IPOs without academic directors 158 8.80 
t-statistics/P-value 1.71/0.04  
As for company size, a significantly positive association at the 1% level of significance is 
reported at the lower quantile, while the association between company size and IPO 
initial returns is negative at the upper quantile level of IPO initial returns. The result 
implies that bigger companies experience less IPO initial returns because such IPOs are 
generally less risky and often characterised by a low degree of ex-ante uncertainty. This 
evidence is consistent with prior IPO studies in the UK (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) 
and Arabian countries (Chahine and Tohmé, 2009) as well as Malaysia (Yatim, 2011) 
which have found that larger companies tend to have lower initial returns. However, 
unlike prior scholars who have documented a significantly negative association between 
company age and IPO initial returns (Chahine and Tohmé, 2009; Loughran and Ritter, 
2004; Engelen and van Essen, 2010), the findings in this study indicate that company age 
is positively associated with IPO initial returns at the lower quantile level at the 10% 
level. 
Interestingly, underwriter reputation and audit quality are significantly associated 
with IPO initial returns at the upper quantile level (.75). Specifically, a significantly 
negative association is found between underwriter reputation and IPO initial returns, 
while a significantly positive association is documented between audit firm reputation 
and IPO initial returns. The negative association between underwriter reputation and IPO 
initial returns is consistent with previous empirical literature, suggesting that underwriter 
reputation plays a significant role in mitigating information asymmetry between issuers 
and prospective investors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). This 
result demonstrates that the signalling power of underwriter reputation exists in the 
Malaysian IPO market. 
In contrast to Beatty (1989) and Titman and Trueman (1986), this study finds that 
signalling assertion of reputable audit firms (Big Four) plays a significant role in 
mitigating information asymmetry between issuers and prospective investors, hence 
leading to lower IPO initial returns. The significantly positive association recorded in this 
study implies that Big Four audit firms are associated with higher IPO initial returns in 
Malaysian IPO market. This implies that prospective investors view audited reports by 
reputable auditors’ as a reflection of true and fair value, thereby increasing the demand of 
IPO and subsequently lead to an increase in closing price of the company shares that 
manifest in IPO initial returns. 
Furthermore, pre-IPO performance is significantly and negatively associated with 
IPO initial returns at the 5% level of significance at the upper quantile level (.75th), 
indicating that companies with low pre-IPO performance experience less IPO initial 
returns. This means that investors in the Malaysian IPO market perceive low level of  
pre-IPO performance as a negative signal about company value, which may indicate that 
such IPOs are of low quality. 
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.25 .50 .75 
HITECH –0.07 (1.27) –0.18 
(5.43)*** 
–0.05 (0.85) 0.08 (2.16)** 1.45 
LNTS 0.02 (0.94) 0.03 (2.73)*** 0.00 (0.01) –0.02 (1.77)* 1.80 
LNAG 0.00 (0.15) 0.04 (1.87)* 0.02 (0.66) –0.01 (0.61) 1.16 
UNDERQ –0.06 (1.49) –0.03 (1.25) –0.06 (1.35) –0.07 
(2.48)*** 
1.15 
AUDITQ 0.05 (1.26) 0.04 (1.56) 0.00 (0.08) 0.07 (2.41)** 1.18 
Z-SCOREDM –0.07 (1.47) –0.04 (1.10) –0.00 (0.07) –0.08 (2.25)** 1.20 
LNBIZE –0.13 (1.26) –0.10 (1.28) –0.05 (0.44) 0.00 (0.05) 1.20 





–0.09 (1.80)* –0.14 
(4.17)*** 
1.15 
PROFDUM 0.01 (0.20) 0.06 (1.22) 0.04 (0.49) –0.06 (1.13) 1.34 
PhD –0.01(0.04) –0.23 (1.39) –0.22 (0.80) 0.35 (2.12)** 1.45 
LEC –0.26 (1.12) 0.07 (0.46) –0.18 (0.72) –0.44 
(2.87)*** 
1.38 
Constant 0.14 (0.41) –0.35 (1.50) 0.22 (0.61) 0.67 (2.92)***  
0bservation 208 208 208 208  
R2% 9.07     
Adjust. R2% 3.48     
Pseudo R2%  13.25 2.62 6.09  
Mean VIF     1.30 
Ramsey 
test/_hatsq 
0.46/0.53     
Notes: IRC represents IPO initial returns. HITECH represents a dummy variable of 1 for 
IPOs in the technology industry, and otherwise, 0. LNTS is the natural logarithm 
of the pre-IPO sales. LNAG is the natural logarithm of one plus the company age. 
UNDERQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for reputable underwriter, and 
otherwise, 0. AUDITQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for reputable audit firm, 
and otherwise, 0. Z-SCOREDM represents a binary figure of 1 for IPOs with 
Altman Z-score value less than 1.23, and otherwise, 0. Specifically, IPOs given 
the value of 1 are considered as companies with weak pre-IPO financial 
performance. LNBSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors 
on the board at the time of IPO. BINDEP is the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board to total number of directors. CEODUA is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the positions of chairperson and CEO are held by a single 
individual at the time of IPO, and otherwise, 0. PROFDUM is a binary number of 
1 for an IPO that has a professor on board, and otherwise, 0. PhD is the proportion 
of directors who have PhD qualification to total number of directors. LEC is the 
proportion of directors who were previously or presently lecturers in a university 
at the time of IPO. In addition, the statistical significance level of variables are 
represented as *, **, *** for 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The figures in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics, while figures out of parenthesis are the coefficient 
values. 
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Moving to the board characteristic variables, board size is found to be insignificantly 
associated with IPO initial returns, suggesting that the number of directors on the board at 
the time of the IPO does not affect the initial returns attributable to IPOs on the first 
trading day. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board at the 
time of the IPO is significantly and negatively associated with IPO initial returns in the 
lower quantile level (.25th) at the 5% significance level. This indicates that IPOs with a 
greater proportion of non-executive directors on the board, which is an indication of 
board independence, experience low IPO initial returns. This evidence is consistent with 
prior studies that have used a sample of French (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008; Chiraz 
and Jarboui, 2016), Sub-Saharan African (Hearn, 2012), Taiwan (Lin and Chuang, 2011), 
UK (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) and USA (Dolvin and Kirby, 2016) IPOs. Thus, one 
can conclude that a greater proportion of non-executive directors on the board at IPO may 
help to reduce the information asymmetry between parties (the issuer and prospective 
investors) in the IPO process, thereby facilitating the reduction of investors’ ex-ante 
uncertainty at the time of the IPO, subsequently affecting the pricing of the IPO 
positively. 
Besides the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, which serves as an 
indication of board independence, CEO duality is also found to be significantly and 
negatively associated with IPO initial returns at the lower (.25th) and upper (.75th) 
quantile levels. By implication, IPOs with a single individual serving as the chairperson 
and CEO produce low initial returns. This means that the dual role during the IPO is 
viewed by investors as a positive signal of company value. In fact, some of the potential 
benefits of CEO duality that could have accounted for the negative association are: 
1 The CEO may be the founder of the company who is likely to have deeper 
knowledge of the company (Dolvin and Kirby, 2016). 
2 Having a single individual simultaneously holding the position of CEO and 
chairperson might increase the company’s responsiveness, if agency problems can be 
kept in check and there is ability to secure critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). 
3 CEO duality might also reflect investors’ belief that a newly-listed or  
growth-oriented company is better served by an incumbent manager who happens to 
be familiar with the company and its growth opportunities (Yatim, 2011). 
Therefore, considering the nature of IPO companies being young and mostly striving for 
market share, CEO duality is perhaps important and can act as a credible signal of future 
performance of the IPO companies. 
With regards to the main explanatory variables, i.e., proportion of PhD holders, 
presence of professors on the board and academic directors’ influence on IPO initial 
returns, Table 5 presents the existing relationships. From Table 5, the proportion of PhD 
holders on the board is significant (at the 5% level) and positively associated with IPO 
initial returns, while the presence of professors on the board at the time of IPO is 
insignificantly associated with IPO initial returns. However, the proportion of academic 
directors on the board at IPO is significantly (at 1% level) and negatively associated with 
IPO initial returns at the upper quantile level (.75th). This result suggests that the 
presence of academic intellectuals on the board signals the company’s quality. Consistent 
with the signalling theory, academics are assumed to be better monitors who can mitigate 
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the level of information asymmetry and agency cost that may be present in the initial 
returns. Therefore, a board consisting of professionals, like academic directors, plays a 
better governance role between a company and its investors. This finding is consistent 
with Anderson et al.’s (2011) argument that investors place valuation premium on the 
heterogeneous nature of the board, such as educational qualification of directors, because 
such individuals have skills and experiences that would enhance the monitoring of the 
board. Other studies have also indicated that highly educated board directors complement 
corporate governance through their enhanced monitoring and advising functions (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Reeb and Zhao, 2013). 
Similarly, in line with the legitimacy role of the board, higher educational 
qualification of directors is recognised as a signal of a company’s legitimacy by 
improving board prestige (Certo, 2003; D’Aveni, 1990). In fact, when accessing external 
funds, legitimate companies may experience lower cost of capital (Wang et al., 2017). 
Francis et al. (2015) provide that academic directors have some unique characteristics 
(e.g., expertise, social connection, network and reputation), which can serve as a signal of 
board quality. On this note, one can relate the findings of the current study to the studies 
of Certo et al. (2001) and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) that show a significantly 
negative association between initial returns and the reputation of the board members at 
the time of the IPO. This can simply imply that the resource-dependence function of 
academic directors is crucial in an environment, like the IPO, where most companies at 
this stage are in search of innovation and growth activities. 
For this reason, the need for a company to open up its boundaries to attain valuable 
knowledge and resources from the external environment is important. In fact, 
academicians can play a vital role in resource provision because universities are 
considered as important sources of innovation (Moon et al., 2017). A university is a 
source of technology transfer, R&D and innovation (Hamdan et al., 2011). Therefore, 
academic directors’ presence on the board at the time of IPOs, can enhance the board’s 
prestige and thus increase the company’s reputation and legitimacy, the consequences of 
which can lead to better facilitation of resources needed for the company’s survival and 
to further signal to potential investors that the company is worthy of investing and 
reducing IPO initial returns. The overall results suggest that academic directors and 
certain characteristics of the board of directors can act as credible signals of IPO 
companies’ quality. 
5 Conclusions 
The study provides explanation on the influence of academic directors on IPO initial 
returns in the Malaysian IPO market, using a sample of IPOs issued between the period 
of 2005 and 2015. With the application of a more sophisticated regression technique 
(QR) in addition to the OLS, the results show that the proportion of academic directors on 
the board is significantly and negatively associated with IPO initial returns at the upper 
quantile level of IPO initial returns. This indicates that academic directors play an 
important signalling role that tends to reduce potential investors’ uncertainty at the time 
of IPO and positively affects the pricing of the IPO, resulting in lower IPO initial returns. 
Other board characteristic variables are also found to have a significant influence on 
IPO initial returns. These include CEO duality, which is negatively associated with IPO 
initial returns on average and in the lower and upper quantile levels, while proportion of 
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non-executive directors is significantly and negatively associated with IPO initial returns 
only in the lower quantile level. Therefore, this study presents that IPO companies can 
mitigate agency problems, uncertainty and associated cost of capital by advocating 
attributes and actions that would signal their quality to external investors. Such attributes, 
in particular, include having higher proportion of academic directors and non-executive 
directors on the board at the time of the IPO. Hence, potential investors can place greater 
value on academic directors in addition to other characteristics of the board as signals of 
a good quality company, which may reduce the level of information asymmetry and the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the company shares, thereby resulting in 
low level of IPO initial returns. 
Other influential variables, like underwriter reputation, pre-IPO financial performance 
and company size are significantly and negatively associated with IPO initial returns. In 
particular, contrary to most studies on Malaysian IPO market that could not find an 
association between underwriter reputation and IPO initial returns, this study finds a 
significant and negative association between underwriter reputation and IPO initial 
returns. This suggests that underwriter reputation has a signalling role. These results can 
help academicians, issuers, investors and policymakers to identify the appropriate board 
structure that can reduce agency problems and uncertainties that manifest themselves in 
IPO underpricing. As for the IPO scholars, this study is an eye-opener that a link can be 
established between academic directors and IPO initial returns, which may imply that 
academic directors can be considered as a good signal of a company’s quality. Similarly, 
issuers of IPOs can deem it fit to consider having university lecturers as academic 
directors on the board, when selecting individuals to be appointed to the board of IPO 
companies. Investors can also use academic directors as an investment screening criteria 
before making investment decisions. Likewise, market regulators can find it appropriate 
to introduce some corporate governance rules that would motivate companies to consider 
the inclusion of academic directors on the board, mostly of IPO companies. However, 
this study is not without some limitations. One of the limitations of this study is that the 
specialised skills and the gender composition of academic directors are not considered, 
whereas, this might have contributed to the significant influence of academic directors on 
IPO initial returns. For instance, Huang et al. (2016) suggest that accounting academics 
can contribute to the efficiency of the capital market. Therefore, future studies can 
investigate whether or not the specialisation and gender composition of academic 
directors contribute to the signalling role of academic directors on the board. 
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Notes 
1 The code sets out the broad principles and specific recommendations on structure and 
processes companies should adopt in creating a good corporate governance culture in their 
business dealings. It also encourages companies to put in place corporate disclosure policies 
that embody good disclosure. 
2 The authors appreciate the anonymous reviewers for recommending this test. 
